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1 Introduction
It is a major challenge in US Treasury debt management to communicate the stance and implica-
tions of current and contemplated debt-issuance actionably yet concisely. A complex, operationally-
intensive policy that currently involves over 250 regular auctions of 14 security types annually, in
various sizes and patterns totaling (as of 2017) almost $4 trillion in total borrowing (here defined
as net new debt plus refinancing of prior-year debt), must be apprehended by strategists and ad-
visors when considering what shall be done and describing the expected result. Discussants must
summarize their views and findings in a common language, and also in a way that aligns with and
informs the practical, on-the-ground decision points that policy makers actually control.
Similarly, while there is a consensus to ensure that decisions be informed by (often quite
complex) quantitative models and simulations created by researchers, it is no small task to bridge
the gap between the product of such models and the tangible needs of and constraints on debt
managers. What is needed is to align theory and numerical metrics with how the path of debt
issuance is envisioned, discussed, and navigated by practitioners.
The purpose of this paper is to motivate and describe strategy metrics that help meet this need.
These metrics and the model behind them are derived from simple and intuitive reasoning about
the long-term, asymptotic implications of ongoing debt issuance in a steady-state environment.
Because of the numerous simplifying assumptions required to render such a calculation coherent
and well-defined, the underlying model is best understood as a complement to, and not a substitute
for, the near- and medium-term debt simulation and optimization efforts more commonly found
in the literature.
By mapping issuance strategies according to these metrics, which (abstractly) represent cost
and risk respectively, one can trace the evolution of Treasury issuance historically, identify an ana-
logue of the efficient frontier, and gauge the likely impact of anticipated changes to the prevailing
issuance pattern. These visualizations can also be done on a forward-looking basis, and are based
on the flow of new-issuance rather than the outstanding stock. The resulting strategy metrics, and
visualizations based on them, can therefore help to summarize and illuminate Treasury issuance
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United States government.
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strategy in ways that aid debt managers in their decisions in a way that is aligned with how those
decisions are contemplated.
2 Motivation
In this section we describe same motivation for the development and usage of these metrics in
visualizing Treasury issuance strategy.
2.1 Escaping WAM
The communication challenge described above is best exemplified by the pervasiveness of a single,
high-level summary metric whenever discussion of debt management turns quantitative. This is
the weighted-average maturity (WAM) of the outstanding portfolio. Often, this metric is taken to
serve as a simultaneous proxy for both cost and risk: all else equal, a portfolio with a high WAM
would be expected to have high debt-servicing cost, and low risk (however measured, whether in
terms of rollover amounts, debt-servicing cost volatility, or other similar metrics).
It is true that the WAM of a portfolio can serve as useful and intuitive shorthand for both
its cost and risk implications over time. The quantity is straightforward, transparently model-
free for anyone to compute, and can be done so using public data. Yet all recognize that it has
inherent shortcomings. For example, a ”barbelled” portfolio composed of half 1-day and half 30-
year bonds has essentially the same WAM as a portfolio containing only 15-year bonds, but very
different rollover and risk implications. (In this extreme example, half of the former portfolio will
need to be refinanced in one day.) Similarly, the WAM of the US Treasury portfolio, which is
at or near modern-day highs (see Figure 1), largely reflects increased issuance flow (in both size
and frequency) of longer-dated borrowing (7- and 10-year notes, and 30-year bonds) that began
near the beginning of this decade. The resulting WAM of around 70 months is a consequence of
disproportionately adding these longer-dated bonds to the portfolio (closely following the 2001-
2006 discontinuation of 30-year issues), which can be seen to have a marked ”hole” near maturities
of around 15 to 20 years. (See Figure 2.)
But WAM masks the fine-grained details of a maturity profile, and to discuss debt management
in terms of managing the portfolio WAM leads to oversimplification of what is in reality a dynamic,
evolving process that is highly influenced by historical issuance patterns.
An added, less well appreciated observation is that WAM is a stock measure (describing, after
all, the outstanding portfolio). Although such a proxy does fit with a rich literature in sovereign
debt issuance modeling that addresses the optimal distribution of stock, in practice Treasury debt
management choices and decisions (absent a significant buyback program) have a more direct effect
not on stock but on flow. That is, under current policy it is (largely) the makeup and sizing of the
regular, ongoing supply of new issuance that is under the direct control of the US Treasury. This
mismatch, between control variables and ostensible target metrics, can make certain statements
and concepts phrased in terms of WAM misleading.
For example, consider a hypothetical strategy of using only 5-year issuance: this might some-
times be interpreted and spoken of (loosely) as using a ”5 year WAM” strategy. But regular,
periodic issuance of 5-year debt does not create a portfolio with a 5-year WAM (the actual WAM
of the resulting portfolio would likely range between 2.5-3 years, and fluctuate with deficits). See
Figure 3 for an illustration, which shows why this occurs and why there is a meaningful difference
between the maturity of new-issuance and the WAM of the resulting portfolio. It also illustrates
2
Figure 1: WAM (weighted-average maturity) of Treasuries outstanding, including those held by the Federal
Reserve. The current (2017Q3) WAM of roughly 71 months is near modern historical highs.
Figure 2: An illustration of the distribution of outstanding Treasury securities, as regards their contribution to
WAM. Here the current-face of each security is scaled by its remaining maturity (in months) and divided by the
total size of the portfolio; the resulting quantities, having units of months, are then aggregated by maturity bucket.
The sum of the column heights in the chart is the WAM itself. This visualization illustrates that the Treasury
portfolio is essentially bifurcated into two distinct portfolios rather than uniformly allocated. The shorter (≤ 15
years) portion of the portfolio has a WAM of around 33 months, but the longer (20+ years) portion of the portfolio
serves to boost WAM to its elevated level (approximately 71 months). All quantities as of end Q3 FY2017.
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that considering and managing the maturity of new debt does not necessarily result in a pre-
dictable WAM, which can and will be affected by fluctuations in deficits and rates. (Conversely,
managing to a particular WAM would require allowing new issuance to fluctuate with deficits and
rates.)
As of 2017, the Treasury portfolio has a WAM of almost 6 years (far longer than 3), issues at
an average maturity of around 3.5-4 years (shorter than 5) and with a median maturity that is
even shorter, at around 3 years. How then to translate a statement about something as simple
as all-5-year issuance into the language of WAM? How to interpret its implications, or even
speak about new-issuance allocation at all, when it is WAM that is the lingua franca of debt
management? Managing debt flow but measuring and tracking WAM becomes a regular source
of miscommunication.
Figure 3: Example of a hypothetical portfolio created by issuing only 5y debt yearly, spread throughout each
year, in the face of rising and randomly-fluctuating deficits. The average maturity of a series of 5y notes with the
same size spread over five years would be 2.5 years, but because deficits grow and fluctuate, the actual WAM of
such a portfolio would fluctuate too, and likely be in the 2.5-3 year range.
The truth is that despite these drawbacks, and however aware debt managers are of them and
attempt to move beyond undue focus on WAM, its simplicity and ubiquity – and, importantly,
the lack of alternatives – makes it too useful not to revert to as a strategy metric and shorthand,
a common reference point for communicating strategy.
2.2 Flow and the cost-risk tradeoff
As stated above, this piece describes an effort undertaken to improve this situation by summarizing
and visualizing Treasury issuance in a way that, while it preserves much of the simplicity and
transparency advantages of WAM, is more aligned with the dynamic and flow-centered nature
of practical debt management and its tradeoffs. We do this by associating to any given issuance
pattern or set of sizes two proxy metrics, one abstractly corresponding to cost and the other to risk.
An issuance strategy or pattern is thereby represented as a point in a cost-versus-risk space (i.e.,
risk-return but from the issuer perspective). As patterns change or issue sizes are adjusted, the
implied cost-risk tradeoff changes. By plotting the trajectory over time, one can illustrate the path
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of Treasury debt management either historically, or in a given projected scenario. The resulting
graph in cost-versus-risk space allows for visualization of debt-management strategy directions
and movements in a way that harnesses intuitions and stylized facts from classical portfolio theory
and efficient frontiers.
Often, scenario analysis in Treasury debt management involves charting out and considering a
future path of issue-sizes over a planning period (for example, 10 years). With over 250 auctions
per year, in the most general of such constructs there would be at least 2500 independent control
variables to consider. Simplification is inevitable. But even if planned representative issue-sizes in
a forward planning period are (for example) stipulated to be constant yearly, with 14 security types
this still creates 140 independent variables. Further reduction of the dimension of this problem
is necessary to comprehensible scenario analysis or consideration of the impacts of a particular
issuance strategy shift.
Practically speaking, then, scenario analysis largely confines itself to consideration of high-level,
easily-comprehended strategy directions. To illustrate, suppose projected funding requirements
compel Treasury to increase borrowing patterns versus status quo. Various groupings of instru-
ments, and/or tenor categories, may be considered, such as: increasing bill sizes pro rata, increase
coupon-bond sizes pro rata, twist short (so that short-tenor instrument sizes are increased faster
than for long tenors), twist long, ”barbell” (e.g. increase the very short and very long tenors,
against the medium tenors), and so forth. The time dimension involved in forward planning only
complicates matters, because (unlike with, say, equity allocation) the question is not how to allo-
cate ”right now” but how to do so over time. And allocation is dynamic; it can and does change
over time.
What follows can be conceived of as an alternative approach to reduced-form modeling and
scenario analysis of this type, one that attempts to capture the salient features and expected long-
term dynamics of more complex quantitative models (e.g. Monte Carlo methods that estimate
a steady-state portfolio given market and strategy assumptions) that are, unavoidably, several
orders of magnitude more computationally intensive. It is also a goal to obviate the need to
focus on specific dollar issue sizes along finely-calibrated forward market paths, and instead bring
relative allocation and borrowing fractions to the forefront of strategic consideration.
Alternatively, and less ambitiously, this piece merely presents simple cost and risk proxy metrics
relevant to and useful in visualizing issuance strategy, in the context of and as an adjunct to what
is, in the abstract, a complex optimal stochastic control problem (for examples of the latter we can
refer the reader to e.g. [6], [10], [12]). The next section gives definitions necessary to understanding
of those metrics.
3 Definitions
This section describes definitions and mathematical constructs required for the metrics we in-
troduce. The starting point is the government’s periodwise budget equation, which (aside from,
possibly, notation) is standard and does not depart from e.g. [3].
Time is discretized into periods, which we will take to be (fiscal) years. In each year t =
0, 1, 2, . . . , dollar outlays are made from the Treasury General Account (TGA) broadly owing to
three sources:
• The difference (a deficit, Dt) between fiscal spending and tax receipts. (This may or may
not coincide with ”primary deficit”, as it includes all (non-interest) spending items that may
5
necessitate debt financing including e.g. student loans.)
• Interest payments on debt, It
• Repayment of maturing debt principal, Mt
To ensure that these outlays do not add to the money stock (a phenomenon that would register
as a reduction in the TGA balance) they must be offset by dollar inflows. This is achieved by
issuing new debt in an amount Nt sufficient to generate the required cash proceeds. Assume for
simplicity that the TGA balance is held constant1 year over year. We therefore must have
Nt = Dt + It +Mt (3.1)
where Nt is the face notional amount to be issued in year t. (Here issuance is assumed to be at
par; any issuance discount is assumed to be contained in It.) More generally, the case where the
TGA balance is not constant but rises over time could be addressed, by (for example) including
cash-balance changes into the deficit term Dt; as long as cash-balance grows at a rate no faster
than do deficits, the below analysis is unaffected.
Assume all debt can be issued in one of several tenors j ∈ (1, 2, . . . , T ). Note here all Treasury
bills are to be lumped into the j = 1 bucket; for simplicity the interest on 1-year debt in year t
is assumed due in year t+ 1. (As well, the inflation component of TIPS and the floating coupons
of FRNs are ignored in this construct; where necessary they are lumped in with their nominal
counterparts by tenor.)
For our purposes here, an issuance strategy is assumed to consist of selecting constant fractions
fj a priori that govern how much of each tenor to issue. That is, in year t Treasury will issue at
tenor j the amount
Nt,j = fjNt = fj(Dt + It +Mt) (3.2)
Obviously the assumption that real-world issuance strategy is described by a set of flow fractions
is debatable. In practice, modern Treasury issuance practice has historically been stated and
managed in terms of the auction sizes (in nominal dollar terms) of its regular notes and bonds.
When necessary, changes to those sizes may be considered going forward. The resulting issuance
process has, consequently, often been characterized by punctuated periods during which nominal
sizes (and not issuance-fractions) of tenors have remained steady, unless and until changed. This
is done in a deliberate manner in keeping with Treasury’s philosophy of ”regular and predictable”
issuance. Clearly, the (empirical) issuance fractions that result from such a process need not
be (and have not been, historically) constant or steady. However, it will be seen that as an
approximation to the actual process over long periods, and as a description of the stance of
issuance allocation (as regards its long-term implications), this fractional model will suffice for our
purposes.
Because It and Mt depend on Ns,j for s ≥ t−T , equation 3.1 is a T -period recursive difference
equation for the yearly vectors of new-issue sizes (Nt,j)
T
j=1, in which deficits Dt play the role of an
exogenous forcing term, one that is presumably unrelated to debt management policy as such.
1This is obviously a simplification. In practice, the revised cash-balance policy announced by the Trea-
sury in 2015 (see Quarterly Refunding Statement of 5/6/2015, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/jl10045.aspx), which stipulates holding sufficient cash to cover a certain number of upcoming daily
outflows (subject to a floor), is likely to cause the TGA balance to naturally drift upward over time as the magni-
tude of average daily outflows increases. Conversely, at times the debt-ceiling suspension mechanics compels the
Treasury to reduce the TGA balance dramatically by a certain date.
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One gauge of the cost of this issuance strategy is just its new-issue weighted average maturity
(NWAM); if measured in years, this quantity can be immediately read off of the issuance fractions
fj via the formula
NWAM =
∑
(j − 1
2
)fj =
∑
jfj − 1
2
(The 1/2 term here adjusts for the fact that Treasury issuance is typically spread throughout a
year.)
In a sense this is the flow equivalent of WAM. This metric itself can provide useful insights
into debt management policy. For example, during the period 2010-16 Treasury WAM steadily
increased, which has been characterized as a policy of ”actively” increasing WAM. But it may
be more descriptive to say merely that Treasury used a very stable and unchanging new-issuance
pattern, and that pattern had a longer-tenor bias. This is illustrated by the relatively flat NWAM
throughout the period. (See Figure 4.) The reason WAM increased as a result is that the issuance
pattern Treasury set in place in 2010-11, and then left largely unchanged, was long-biased (had
a high NWAM of 45-50 months) compared to historical practice and to the (lower) breakeven
NWAM that would have maintained the length of the outstanding portfolio at its then-extant
level.
Figure 4: NWAM (new-issue weighted-average maturity) of Treasury issuance in trailing 12 months. Since 2010-11
the average maturity of new-issuance has been well above historical averages.
4 Steady asymptotic limit
How is the recursion (3.2) used to derive cost and risk proxies? What we seek is to characterize
the long-term implications of using a given strategy, as described by the issuance fractions fj.
Conceptually, we would like to think of the portfolio as being in (in some sense) a ”steady-state”,
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so that we may ask questions about how current issuance affects or causes the portfolio to drift
toward that steady-state. This long-term, steady-state-centered point of view is meant to be
the logical extension of a common modeling approach in which a portfolio, under some issuance
strategy assumption, is simulated for a long period of time (10, 20 years or more) and then the
resulting metrics are averaged and examined at the horizon or in an abstract future period (cf.
[6]).
Granted, it is not obvious that such a steady-state can or does exist. In practice, fiscal
deficits and interest rates fluctuate in a correlated and possibly secular manner; issuance tenors
and strategies, meanwhile, can change. The Treasury portfolio historically shows little signs
of ever having converged to a steady-state per se. As well, nominal quantities all grow over
time, restricting the possible quantities that can even be said to be steady or homogeneities that
may exist. A model with the ambition of calculating and describing the ”steady-state”, long-
term consequence of an issuance strategy evidently must be abstract and hypothetical in nature.
Simplifying assumptions must be made.
Here, we make two major assumptions:
• Deficits grow geometrically at a constant rate of g per year (Dt ∼ (1 + g)t).
• The yield curve (interest rates rj, j = 1, . . . , T ) is static and constant yearly.
The reader will object that the above are unrealistically simplified assumptions; they are
better conceived of as representing long-term averages around which a real market-data path
might plausibly fluctuate and to which it might mean-revert.
The motivation for these assumptions is precisely that these appear to be the conditions nec-
essary for a rolling Treasury portfolio to become self-similar and approach a meaningful ”steady-
state” as t → ∞. Indeed, under these assumptions we can solve for the long-term asymptotic
equilibrium portfolio of equation (3.2) and observe its properties and metrics. In the below,
we highlight two such metrics that naturally represent this asymptotic steady-state portfolio as
regards its cost and risk.
4.1 Cost proxy
Under appropriate and historically plausible conditions on r and g, we show in Appendix A.2 that
the effective interest-cost percentage, or (to abuse terminology slightly, given our approximation
of discount bills as 1-period coupon bonds) weighted-average coupon (WAC) of the portfolio under
the strategy f (defined as WACt = It/zt−1, where z· represents the total debt stock) approaches
a constant asymptotic limit
WACt → WAC∗ =
∑
wjrj
where wj are weights that depend only on f and g (not on r):
wj =

fj(1− (1 + g)−j)∑
k fk(1− (1 + g)−k)
, g > 0
jfj∑
kfk
, g = 0
(4.1)
In essence wj are compounded and growth-adjusted new-issue fractions. They represent the im-
plication that using issuance strategy f has for interest cost – how using allocation f , in effect,
”samples the yield curve” in the long haul.
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The weights wj are adjustments of the new-issue fractions fj. Note that for g > 0 the ad-
justment (downward) is larger for short tenors than for longer tenors. This reflects the fact that
longer-tenor interest rates play a larger role in portfolio WAC when the portfolio is dominated
by recent issuance and (consequently) recently-issued longer bonds are present as a significant
component of stock. That is precisely the situation when deficit growth g is positive and large:
recent issuance is more prominent.
The quantity WAC∗ = WAC∗(f ; g, r) serves as a cost indicator of using issuance strategy
f . Obviously it is not intended as a true calculation of the cost either ”right now” or on any
particular path; rather, it is a gauge of the expected long-term, structural cost (asymptotically) if
the strategy is to be maintained, and if near-term fluctuations in deficits and rates are neglected.
But given that Treasury subscribes to a philosophy of ”regular and predictable” issuance, and
does not attempt to time the market, in our view it is the precisely this long-term asymptotic
expectation that is the proper orientation when it comes to a high-level cost assessment.
Of course, WAC∗ also depends strongly on the particular asymptotic rate assumption r. To
remove this dependence, we calculate a quantity representing a ”WAC-effective” tenor:
tWAC =
∑
jwj
Higher/lower values of tWAC should be associated with higher/lower cost, all else equal (and
assuming an upward-sloping and relatively-smooth yield curve r). This makes tWAC – which is
effectively a variant of NWAM, but using compounded and growth-adjusted weights w rather than
the issuance fractions f – a useful rate-assumption-free cost proxy for issuance strategy f .
4.2 Risk proxy
Opinions and choices vary on how to gauge risk in debt-management. One can find in regular use
as risk metrics the stochastic variance (i.e. uncertainty, whether conditional or unconditional) of
interest-cost, the variability of interest-cost one can expect to observe unfolding over time, and
measures of interest cost such as Cost-at-Risk (CaR) and variants that are based on the tails of the
distribution of outcomes (examples for some/all of these can be found in, for example, [1], [2], [6],
[7], [8], [11], [12], [13], [18]). There is also a growing view that the focus of cost quantification ought
to be the primary balance (or total deficit) rather than interest cost in isolation (cf. [4], [16], [18]).
Some sovereigns also place exogenous bounds on simple gross quantities such as required auction
sizes, gross interest cost, or Debt/GDP ; these too, where applicable, serve as risk constraints.
Without taking specific a view on the matter, we simply observe that arguably, any/all of
these are dependent on and correlated with a simple quantity, the yearly maturing amount (i.e.,
rollover fraction). After all, the higher a percentage of the portfolio that must be rolled yearly,
• The more exposed is the portfolio to unanticipated interest-rate movement;
• The more volatile we can expect the portfolio interest cost to be (locked-in interest costs
are, by nature, not volatile over time);
• The larger tail measures such as Cost-at-Risk should be (again because the portfolio is more
exposed to unanticipated spikes in interest rates, to tails in their distribution);
• The larger the bill issue sizes are (more bills is part and parcel of what creates high rollover).
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The yearly rollover amount is therefore a simple and useful risk proxy. It is calculable in the
asymptotic steady-state setup described above. This quantity RRt, representing the percent of
portfolio in year t that matures by t+ 1, is shown in Appendix A.3 to approach a constant limit:
RRt → RR∗ =
∑
τjwj
where the weights wj are as defined in (4.1), and
τj =

g
(1 + g)j − 1, g > 0
1
j
, g = 0
As with WAC∗, the measure RR∗ = RR∗(f ; g) gauges the long-term, asymptotic, steady-state
implication of using issuance strategy f , but for risk. Namely, using f indefinitely can be expected
to create a portfolio of which the fraction RR∗ must be rolled yearly. Higher RR∗ indicates higher
risk; this is our risk proxy metric.
4.3 Frontier
A natural question at this point is which strategies comprise the efficient frontier under these cost
and risk metrics. In Appendix A.4 we show that under certain regularity conditions on r, when
the required risk level is fixed at some given level τj (i.e. the constraint RR
∗ ≤ R is imposed
for R := τj), the strategy that minimizes the cost measure tWAC is issuance concentrated on the
single tenor
j := j∗(R) =

log(1 +
g
R
)
log(1 + g)
, g > 0
1
R
, g = 0
When R is not of the form τj for integer j, but lies in between τj and τj+1, then the lowest-cost
strategy is an appropriate blend of issuance at tenors j and j+ 1. So in effect, for any level of risk
R these metrics imply there is a ”sweet spot” tenor given by the formula j∗(R) around which a
concentrated-issuance strategy is the cost-dominant one for risk = R. This tenor is illustrated in
Figure 5 for several choices of g.
Note in the limit as g → 0 this optimal tenor is simply j = 1/R (see solid curve in Figure 5).
Stated conversely, when g = 0 the ”risk” of j-year issuance using our metric is just RR∗(g = 0) =
1/j, recovering the intuitive notion that a j-year issuance strategy creates a portfolio of which
roughly 1/j is rolled yearly. Indeed, [17] proposes a risk proxy based on assigning weight 1/j to
j−period borrowing. By using the metric RR∗ as risk proxy, we are able to make the appropriate
and growth-adjusted generalization of that simple intuition to arbitrary new-issuance strategies
f .
5 Long-term deficit and rate assumptions
The metrics described above depend on deficit-growth and interest rate assumption parameters.
For our purposes it is best to calibrate these to longer-term averages that can serve as a plausible
description of asymptotic behavior.
10
Figure 5: ”Sweet-spot” tenor vs. rollover (RR∗) constraint. Single-issuance strategy at the given tenor (or if not
possible, a blend of nearby tenors) dominates other issuance strategies f with the same RR∗(f). Frontier is shown
for g = 0, 4, 8, 12%; higher values of g reduce the risk-mitigation created by longer-tenor issuance, because faster
deficit-growth reduces the relative importance of long-past issuance to the portfolio, making shorter tenors more
efficient.
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For rates we can use, for example, a simple average of history rates (see Table 1). Such a
yield curve is wider than the current market environment as of 2017, so it embeds an assumption
that some reversion to the mean or normalizing will have taken place in the long-term. Internal
calculations use a set of long-term forward rate assumptions produced by OMB as part of its
budget process.
Table 1: Historically averaged yields 1981-present (derived from H15 curve; source: FRED).
Tenor 1y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 20y 30y
Yield (%) 3.24 3.56 3.79 4.22 4.54 4.79 4.88 5.39
For deficits we observe the log-linear trend of deficit growth over several historical decades
(post-1970, when primary deficits began to be the norm) to be roughly g = 8%, so that is our
base case choice. See Figure 6.
Figure 6: Primary deficits (source: FRED) portrayed log-linearly, excluding surplus years. The long-term trend
(post-1970) is closest to an 8% per year increase. The implied growth of future primary deficits and other-means-
of-financing forecast by CBO (also shown) as of June 2017 is consistent with this trend.
Because the intent is to be parsimonious and represent average dynamics rather than to overfit
to any particular rate or deficit scenario, the hope is that results are not overly sensitive to these
choices. A natural question therefore is how our proxy metrics vary with the rate and deficit
assumptions behind them. Obviously tWAC is unaffected by the particular choice of r, by design.
WAC∗ =
∑
wjrj depends in a linear way on r; tilting r wider and steeper would increase WAC
∗
(and conversely for tighter/flatter), but in a somewhat uniform way. That is, when comparing
two strategies in terms of WAC∗, simple shifts or rescalings of r (within plausible limits) will tend
not to materially alter the relative cost relationship between them.
The effect of the deficit growth assumption g = 8% may appear more ambiguous. Generally, for
a given strategy f , increasing the assumed g will increase its computed cost (tWAC) but decrease its
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computed risk (RR∗). Figure 5 shows the effect of these shifts for various choices of g on frontier
(concentrated-issuance) strategies. As with rates, such a shift in g within a plausible range of
4 − 12% appears unlikely to materially alter conclusions drawn regarding the relative cost/risk
relationship between two sufficiently-distinct strategies.
As stated in Appendix A.1, there is also a technical requirement, for our simple construction
to lead to the explicit analytical formulas described above, that g > WAC∗. (Otherwise the
equilibrium WAC∗ can only be calculated implicitly.) This does not appear to be overly restrictive;
as shown in Figure 7, using a simple estimate of the effective WAC (adjusting the WAC of coupon-
bearing securities by the 6m bill yield × the bill fraction of the portfolio) we see that only in the
early 1980s Volcker era did the effective-WAC exceed 8%. (Note, this was also a period when
deficit growth was far higher than 8% per year.) The average is closer to 6% and the recent trend
has been under 2%. All indications are that deficit-driven rather than interest-driven debt growth
is the asymptotic behavior that is relevant.
Figure 7: Interest-cost measure based on weighted-average coupon (WAC) of outstanding Treasury securities,
adjusted by the 6m bill rate × the bills percentage of the portfolio, from 1980 to 2017Q3. The adjustment is
necessary because bills contribute a 0% coupon to the naive WAC calculation.
It is also worth acknowledging that our calculations are in strict nominal terms and based on
the simple mechanical mathematics of debt-rolling. In so doing we knowingly leave considerations
such as the debt-to-GDP ratio and the intertemporal budget constraint, transversality conditions,
and/or sustainability considerations (see, for example, [14]) aside. As well, apparently the oft-cited
correlation or feedback between issuance, interest rates, and fiscal needs as in the tax-smoothing
and Ramsey planning literature (cf. [15], [5], [9]) is omitted here.
6 Mapping strategy to cost-risk space
We have described how a set of issuance fractions f can, under simple assumptions about deficits
and rates, be mapped into cost-versus-risk space. There are several alternatives described above
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(depending on the level of exactness or abstraction desired):
• f → (RR∗, NWAM)
• f → (RR∗,WAC∗)
• f → (RR∗, tWAC)
Summarize this abstractly by stipulating that to each set of fractions f we form the mapping
f → (R,C)
where R is the risk-proxy metric and C the cost-proxy chosen. (In what follows, unless otherwise
stated we use C = tWAC .)
To illustrate this mapping, when f = ej (i.e. concentrated regular issuance only at tenor j),
this mapping becomes
f = ej → (τj, j)
The j = 1 strategy maps to (R = 100%, C = 1), low cost but high risk. The j = 30 strategy
maps (with g = 8%) to (R = 0.88%, C = 30), high cost but low risk. Other examples of this
mapping and its dependence on g for single-tenor strategies f = ej are shown in Table 2, which
also highlights the dependence on g, especially for longer tenors. (This also helps illustrate why
we did not ignore deficit-growth in our construct, or use the naive rollover metric obtained by
simply taking τj = 1/j.)
Note that in this reductive case, the choice of r plays little meaningful role, as long as r is
monotone increasing (as would be the case for any plausible long-term asymptotic rate assump-
tion). This is because using C = WAC∗ we just have WAC∗ = rj. Since rj is monotone-increasing
in j, the two proxies are equivalent in the sense of sorting single-tenor strategies by relative cost
(i.e., rj > rk ⇐⇒ j > k for all j, k).
Table 2: Examples of the mapping f → (R,C) where f represents a single-tenor issuance strategy at tenor
j = 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 30. The cost proxy C = tWAC for this case reduces to C = j. (If C = WAC
∗ is used instead,
then we would just have C = rj , which for monotone increasing rates r would not alter the relative cost picture.)
The risk proxy R depends on the deficit-growth assumption g: faster deficit growth implies less relative rollover
contribution from long-past issuance of longer tenors.
Deficit growth factor (g)
Single-tenor strategy (y) 4% 8% 12%
1 (100%,1) (100%,1) (100%,1)
2 (49%,2) (48.1%,2) (47.2%,2)
3 (32%,3) (30.8%,3) (29.6%,3)
5 (18.5%,5) (17%,5) (15.7%,5)
7 (12.7%,7) (11.2%,7) (9.9%,7)
10 (8.3%,10) (6.9%,10) (5.7%,10)
30 (1.8%,30) (0.9%,30) (0.4%,30)
Real-world issuance strategies are of course not usually concentrated on single tenors, as for
various reasons Treasury can be seen to issue regularly across the yield curve. But what this
method allows is to place any nontrivial issuance pattern f into (R,C) space in a way that
remains consistent with simple intuition about the tradeoffs between cost and risk in the single-
tenor thought experiment. Applications of this principle are demonstrated in the next section.
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7 Usage and results
In this section we describe how the proxy metrics described above are used to illustrate and
visualize debt issuance strategy. All projected quantities are hypothetical and for illustrative
purposes only.
7.1 Summarizing historical issuance strategy
How can these metrics, which by construction relate to asymptotic portfolio behavior, be applied
to actual Treasury debt issuance? It can be observed historically that Treasury does not evidently
select and then use indefinitely a single set of fractions f for its issuance pattern. Instead, the
issuance pattern can only be observed empirically, as a consequence of Treasury decisions and
events. Nor does the asymptotic portfolio ever actually emerge, as fiscal, market and (indeed)
debt management strategy may evolve and fluctuate.
But for historical issuance we can still analyze issue fractions a posteriori: aggregate all issuance
within a fiscal year and observe the empirical issuance fractions that were used, by setting
fj = Aj/A
where here Aj represents the amount issued in tenor bucket j, and A represents total issuance,
during the year. (Note that bills that were issued and matured prior to the end of the fiscal year
are not counted in At, since it is meant to reflect net borrowing required to finance Dt + It +Mt.)
Table 3 shows how this calculation applies to summarizing Treasury issuance during fiscal-year
2016.
Table 3: Fiscal-year 2016 Treasury issuance summarized as issuance fractions by tenor bucket. Bills are placed in
the 1y bucket, TIPS/FRNs with their nominal counterparts. Bills issued/matured within the year are excluded;
only net new issuance (live as of 9/30/16) is included. Figures here exclude debt purchased by Federal Reserve
SOMA account as auction add-ons, being not directly germane to Treasury issuance strategy.
Empirical Issuance Fractions (FY2016)
Tenor (y) Security Type Notional ($bn) Flow Issuance Fraction
1 Bills $1,647 $1,647 42.3%
2
Notes/Bonds $350
$520 13.4%FRN $170
3 Notes/Bonds $300 $300 7.7%
5
Notes/Bonds $462
$509 13.1%TIPS $47
7 Notes/Bonds $381 $381 9.8%
10
Notes/Bonds $267
$347 8.9%TIPS $80
30
Notes/Bonds $167
$189 4.9%TIPS $22
Total: $3,892
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We can thus create this mapping in each historical year t:
Debt issued in year t→ f (t) → (R(t), C(t))
In so doing we are summarizing a year’s issuance pattern by mapping it to the asymptotic properties
of the portfolio it would create if continued indefinitely. The table presented in Figure 8 summarizes
this calculation when applied to 2016 issuance in fractional form.
Figure 8: Mapping f → (R,C) shown for FY2016 issuance summarized as empirical new-issue fractions, and using
a long-term rate assumption derived from post-1980 historical-averages. Risk (RR∗) and Cost (WAC∗) proxies
shown for three deficit growth assumptions, g = 4, 8, 12%. Using base-case g = 8%, the method summarizes 2016
issuance as having selected (R,C) = (25.3%, 4.39%) in cost-versus-risk space. Average new-issue maturity was
around four years (NWAM = 49 months), but tWAC = 10 implies that under this issuance pattern it is the ∼
10-year interest rate behavior/assumption that will be of most importance to longer-term portfolio interest cost
when issuing using this allocation.
Treasury issuance strategy from fiscal years 1981-2016 is summarized and portrayed in Figure 9
(using g = 8%) with this technique. The approach serves to highlight outlier years: 2015 was an
especially long-biased issuance pattern; 2001-2002 were short-biased years (in large part due to
the discontinuation of 30-year bond issuance).
We see that current Treasury issuance (FY2016) has pulled back somewhat from its recent long
bias. This is presumably a partial consequence of the mid-2015 decision2 to increase bills stock,
but also of the February 2016 decision3 to reduce issue sizes of 5y and longer notes/bonds/TIPS.
Figure 10 portrays the same diagram but using tWAC rather than WAC
∗ as cost proxy. This
transforms and stretches the diagram, but does not appear to materially alter the relative relation-
ships between yearly strategies, or outliers. This should be unsurprising given the fact that r is
monotone-increasing (as would be any plausible long-term asymptotic interest-rate assumption).
Figures 11-12 replicate these diagrams but using g = 4% rather than 8%. We see that although
the quantities change, relative relationships among yearly strategies are largely (albeit not entirely)
robust to changes in the long-term deficit-growth assumption.
2Quarterly Refunding Statement of Acting Assistant Secretary for Financial Markets Seth B. Carpenter,
5/6/2015 (https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl10045.aspx)
3Quarterly Refunding Statement of Acting Assistant Secretary for Financial Markets Seth B. Carpenter,
2/3/2016 (https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0338.aspx)
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Figure 9: Empirical Treasury issuance from FY1981-2016 summarized on a (RR∗,WAC∗) diagram. Assumes
deficit-growth trend g = 8%. Rate assumption derived from historical H15 rates, 1981-2016 (FRED). SOMA auction
purchases and Bills issued as part of the Federal Reserve’s Supplementary Financing Program (SFP) are excluded
for this exercise. Omits effect of the large-scale buyback operations in 2000-2002, which were largely focused on
15+ year debt, implying an effective issuance policy slightly shorter (higher RR∗) on net than portrayed here.
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Figure 10: Empirical Treasury issuance from FY1981-2016 summarized on a (RR∗, t∗WAC) diagram. Assumes
deficit-growth trend g = 8%. The dependence of the cost metric on rates has been removed by using tWAC as cost
proxy. Relative relationships between yearly strategies and outliers remain largely unchanged.
Figure 11: Empirical Treasury issuance from FY1981-2016 summarized on a (RR∗,WAC∗) diagram, assuming
deficit-growth trend g = 4%.
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Figure 12: Empirical Treasury issuance from FY1981-2016 summarized on a (RR∗, t∗WAC) diagram, assuming
deficit-growth trend g = 4%.
7.2 Spot issuance strategy
Rather than the a posteriori empirical analysis of the previous section, we can gauge the cur-
rent stance of issuance strategy by using prevailing issuance sizes (rather than rolled-up issuance
throughout a year) to infer the new-issue fractions f that they imply.
For example, the current size of a new-issue 30-year bond (as of 2017) is $15 billion, a new
CUSIP is issued four times per year, and each is reopened twice in amounts of $12 billion. Under
such a policy, the implied yearly flow of 30-year issuance is 4(15 + 12 + 12) = $156 billion. We
calculate the flow for all other tenors in the same manner, and from those, the implied fractions
f these sizes represent. This is illustrated in Figure 13 for issuance sizes prevailing as of end Q3
2017. (As a technical note: when doing this for bills we use yearly-averaged bill sizes rather than
current bill sizes, because bill issuance fluctuates throughout the year due to their role as fiscal
shock-absorber. Since our goal is to infer the stance of issuance strategy we need to eliminate this
exogenous seasonality effect.)
Spot strategies are calculated monthly in this manner from 1992-present (see Figure 14). The
joint evolution is portrayed in Figure 15 as a trajectory on an (R,C) diagram. They are also
broken out into individual periods in Figure 16. Several apparently distinct periods of Treasury
issuance policy can be tracked on these illustrations:
• Reduced term borrowing from falling deficits in 1990s
• Elimination of 30y bond in 2001 - 2006
• Shift in term borrowing post 9/11/2001
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Figure 13: Treasury issuance strategy in terms of new-issue fractions inferred from new-issue sizes as of end
2017Q3. For bills, the average size over the preceding year is used in order to remove seasonality effects.
• Lengthening of issuance allocation post-financial crisis
What is perhaps most salient here, in the final graph of Figure 16, is the clustering of policy points
(green, upper left) that is seen from June 2010 - October 2015. This is the post-financial-crisis
period of actively extending WAM, i.e., of employing a relatively static new issuance flow strategy
with a long bias. The graph also shows that policy has begun to shorten modestly since, with the
early 2016 reductions in all 5+ year issuance sizes.
Applying (R,C) metrics to spot-issuance patterns allows one to illustrate and visualize the
path and direction of Treasury issuance in a way that lines up with how debt management is most
directly announced and affected: by considering and/or making specific changes to issue sizes,
by introducing or removing tenors, by changing auction schedules – by altering Treasury flow.
Key historical decisions about Treasury issuance become plainly visible as movement in (R,C)
space. Conversely, periods such as 2011-16 in which (we assert) issuance strategy was effectively
unchanged emerge as periods of little or no such movement. Note that in such periods of static
issuance-strategy, WAM may be changing rapidly, which again highlights the distorted picture
that can be painted by WAM.
7.3 Visualizing forward scenarios
Another benefit of mapping issuance to our representative (R,C) metrics is that one can visualize
the direction and effect of potential forward strategy options in a simple, intuitive way that escapes
the need to examine dozens or hundreds of individual, projected future issue sizes.
For example, suppose financing needs are due to increase, and Treasury considers one of three
strategy options in response:
• Increase only bill sizes incrementally as needed; leave all other sizes unchanged
• A shorter-tenor strategy preferentially favoring increases to bills, 2-3y notes, and the 2y
floating rate note
• Keep bill, TIPS and FRN sizes constant, and increase the coupon stack pro rata as needed
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Figure 14: Implied monthly cost- and risk-proxies employed for Treasury issuance from 1992 - June 2017. Most-
recent new issue sizes are combined with upcoming auction schedules to infer issuance fractions. CMBs, Bills
issued as part of the Federal Reserve’s Supplementary Financing Program (SFP), and effect of 2000-2002 large
scale buybacks are excluded for this exercise.
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Figure 15: Implied monthly path of Treasury issuance strategies from 1992 - June 2017 portrayed on an (R,C)
diagram. Most-recent new issue sizes are combined with upcoming auction schedules to infer issuance fractions.
CMBs, Bills issued as part of the Federal Reserve’s Supplementary Financing Program (SFP), and effect of 2000-
2002 large scale buybacks are excluded for this exercise.
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Figure 16: Treasury Issuance strategy 1992 - 2017Q3 broken out into three periods: pre-9/11/2001, pre-financial
crisis, and post crisis. 2010-2016 implied strategy shows as relatively constant (green cluster) in the third graph.
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In Figure 17 each of these three strategy approaches have been simulated for ten years under
hypothetical rate and deficit assumptions, and the issue-size-implied allocations plotted as tra-
jectories on the (R,C) diagram. The different cost and risk implications of each of the strategy
options become evident.
Figure 17: Yearly spot-(R,C) diagrams of three hypothetical strategy approaches to financing incremental is-
suance over a 10-year forward period.
Portraying strategies in this way can help the policy maker understand the implications of and
relationships between the cost-risk tradeoffs involved in strategy alternatives.
7.4 Constrained scenarios
The idealized efficient frontier mentioned above in (R,C) space will typically consist of single-
tenor issuance at some optimal tenor. Obviously this is not realistic, practical, or even desirable:
Treasury has a long-established policy of issuing and maintaining many liquid benchmarks across
the yield curve. There are other factors that can motivate against the literal interpretation of
the concentrated issuance as optimal: the model omits feedback between issuances and rates, for
example. For all intents, a concentrated issuance strategy f = ej would be considered inadmissible
as a strategy option. This raises the point that strategies must belong to the admissible set of
strategies in order to be legitimately considered as potential allocation adjustments.
Defining admissible strategies is ultimately the province of the debt manager; the process and
considerations behind it are beyond the scope of this piece. But the effect of constraints – the
debt manager’s ”policy window” of admissible strategies – on the analysis above, modifies the
framework only slightly. A common approach may be to define lower and upper bounds L and
U for the new-issuance allocations (or equivalently, upper bounds on changes from the current
allocation fcurr); this defines the admissible set to be strategies such that L ≤ f ≤ U . Each
such strategy has a point on the (R,C) diagram, and it is straightforward to identify dominant
directions that reduce cost or risk (see Appendix A.5). This idea is depicted in Figure 18.
These dominant and constrained-optimal strategy directions could be used to inform policy
decisions as to how to adjust borrowing patterns in the face of anticipated changes in financing
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Figure 18: Schematic illustration of issuance strategies constrained to a ”policy window” (admissible set) of
allowed strategies, mapped to an (R,C) diagram. Cost- and risk-dominant strategy directions from the current
issuance pattern fcurr, as well as the optimal strategy within the admissible set (generally a simplex, for simple
linear constraints), are easily calculated.
requirements. For example, if deficits are anticipated to rise (creating a ”funding gap” if current
issue-size flow were maintained), borrowing at which tenor(s) should be increased in order to
close the gap? Different choices of tenor(s) imply different new-issue allocations f , which can be
evaluated in terms of how they alter the cost and risk proxy metrics described above.
8 Summary
We introduce simple cost and risk proxy metrics that can be attached to empirical Treasury is-
suance, to ”spot” issuance patterns, and/or to forward issuance scenarios over time. These metrics
are based on mapping issuance fractions to their long-term, asymptotic portfolio implications for
cost (C) and risk (R) under mechanical debt-rolling dynamics, and given simple but necessary
assumptions about asymptotic deficit growth and interest rates.
Mapping strategies to the resulting (R,C) diagram enables one to harness the intuitions of
standard portfolio theory, including the efficient frontier, which in this simple construct can be
calculated analytically as an optimal single-tenor issuance strategy corresponding to a given risk
tolerance.
Comparing historical or future issuance to the frontier and to past issuance enables policy
makers to understand the direction and implication of the issuance decisions and implied tradeoffs
they make in a way that is more dynamic and flow-centered than the traditional portfolio metric
(WAM). As such these metrics are a valuable tool in discussing and understanding Treasury debt
management.
Although the recursion model used to derive these metrics is clearly reductive, there is scope to
expand on the work by, for example, endowing it with rate and deficit paths that are stochastic,
mean-reverting, and correlated. Ultimately the steady WAC∗ and rollover-fraction RR∗ that
we derive under our simple steady recursion model may be understood to represent – under
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appropriate assumptions – a special case of the stochastic equilibrium portfolio of a more complex
and market-realistic model. Another potential area of refinement is to model the dynamics of
inflation-linked (TIPS) and floating-rate (FRNs) debt rather than binning them with nominal
counterparts.
While work is ongoing, we hasten to add that in bridging the gap between debt management
modeling and practice model complexity and (often illusory) macroeconomic completeness ought
not be impediments to intuitive metrics that can aid consideration and communication of debt
management strategy – and, which are aligned with the considerations of debt management as it
is implemented.
A Appendix
A.1 Equilibrium portfolio distribution
Start with equation (3.2) for new-issue amounts issued yearly, written as a vector equation for
nt = (Nt,j)j:
nt = f(Dt + It +Mt)
Define the stock in year t:
zt = zt−1 +Nt −Mt = zt−1 +Dt + It
Using our asymptotic assumption about deficits we can write
Dt = D0γ
t−1 (A.1)
where γ := 1 + g.
We seek the steady average interest cost at equilibrium, defined as
WAC∗ = lim
t
It/zt−1 (A.2)
This means asymptotically we should have
zt = βzt−1 +D0γt−1
where β := 1 +WAC∗. This can be solved:
zt = z0β
t +
D0
γ − β (γ
t − βt)
Now assume that γ > β (i.e. that g > WAC∗). Under this assumption (which we acknowledge to
depart from what is often assumed in the literature, cf. [3], but which appears to be the empirically
relevant case), as t→∞ this becomes
zt ∼ D0
γ − βγ
t, (A.3)
i.e. zt ∼ O(γt).
Define qj,t to be the stock of current tenor j at time t. Of course, zt =
∑
j qj,t. Collect these
quantities into a vector: Qt := (qj,t)j. Stock of current-tenor j comes from two sources: rolldown
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of current-tenor stock j + 1 from the previous year, and new-issuance at tenor j in the current
year. This implies a recurrence for Qt:
Qt = SQt−1 + f(Dt + It +Mt)
where S is a shift operator (Sij = δj,i+1). Notice that the maturing amount Mt is simply
Mt = q1,t−1 = eT1Qt−1
Therefore
Qt = (S + fe
T
1 )Qt−1 + f(Dt + It) := RQt−1 + f(Dt + It) (A.4)
where R := S + feT1 .
We are interested in the evolution of portfolio fractions, defined as
θt :=
1
zt
Qt
That is, θj,t represents the percentage of the portfolio at time t with current-tenor j. From
equation (A.4) we find
θt =
1
zt
Qt =
zt−1
zt
(
1
zt−1
Qt−1) +
1
zt
f(Dt + It) =
zt−1
zt
Rθt−1 +
1
zt
f(Dt + It) := A+B + C
and treat the terms A, B, and C separately by using (A.3), (A.1) and (A.2) to write
A→ 1
γ
Rθt−1
B → 1
γ
(γ − β)
C → 1
γ
(β − 1)
The equilibrium portfolio distribution θt → θ∗ must therefore satisfy
θ∗ =
1
γ
Rθ∗ + (1− 1
γ
)f
or
θ∗ = (γ − 1)(γI −R)−1f
Letting y = θ∗/(γ−1) we must have (γI−R)y = (γI−S)y−y1f = f , or y = (1+y1)(γI−S)−1f .
Equivalently
θ∗ ∝ (γI − S)−1f := Tγf
where the constant of proportionality is pinned down by the condition that
∑
θ∗j = 1. So we may
write
θ∗ =
1
||Tγf ||1Tγf
and it is easy to show that Tγ is an upper-triangular matrix with
(Tγ)ij =
1
γj−i+1
, j ≥ i
The preceding holds in the limiting case γ → 1 as well.
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A.2 Asymptotic WAC
Assume the interest-rate applicable to tenor-j issuance in year t is simply rj. This is paid out in
the following years t + 1, t + 2, . . . t + j as an amount rjNj,s. Therefore the net interest owed in
year t from all prior-year issuance of tenors j = 1, . . . ,M is
It =
M∑
j=1
t−1∑
s=t−j
rjNj,s =
M∑
j=1
rjfj(
t−1∑
s=t−j
Ns)
In the limit we seek, It = WAC
∗zt−1 = (β − 1)zt−1, or
It ∼ 1
γ
(β − 1)zt (A.5)
using the asymptotic behavior (A.3) of zt. To derive the appropriate WAC
∗ rewrite the above as
It = (
M∑
j=1
rjfjbj,t)zt (A.6)
where
bj,t :=
1
zt
t−1∑
s=t−j
Ns (A.7)
Asymptotically, expression (3.2) for the sequence Nt can be written
Nt = D0γ
t−1 + (β − 1)
[
z0β
t +
D0
γ − β (γ
t − βt)
]
+
M∑
j=1
fjNt−j
where we have symbolically inserted asymptotic expressions (A.1) and (A.2) for Dt and It re-
spectively, and made use of the fact that the maturing amount relates to prior issuance by
Mt =
∑M
j=1 fjNt−j.
This is a nonhomogeneous difference equation for Nt of the form
Nt =
M∑
j=1
fjNt−j + at
where asymptotically, and using our assumption of γ > β,
at ∼ D0γt−1 γ − 1
γ − β . (A.8)
It may be homogenized by defining Ut := Nt − Cat, using
C :=
1∑
j fj(1− γ−j)
Then Ut =
∑M
j=1 fjUt−j; in particular, the sequence Ut is bounded (because
∑
fj = 1). As a
result, Ut/zt → 0 as t → ∞ and can be neglected. We are left with 0 = Nt − Cat or Nt ∼ Cat;
returning to (A.7) we find asymptotically,
bj,t ∼ 1
zt
C
t−1∑
s=t−j
as ∼ C 1− γ
−j
γ
,
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where we have used expression A.8 for as and A.3 for zt. Expression (A.6) becomes
It =
1
γ
C
(
M∑
j=1
rjfj(1− γ−j)
)
zt
Comparing with (A.5), we identify
WAC∗ = β − 1 = C
M∑
j=1
rjfj(1− γ−j) =
∑M
j=1 rjfj(1− γ−j)∑
j fj(1− γ−j)
=
∑
wjrj,
with
wj =
fj(1− γ−j)∑
k fk(1− γ−k)
. (A.9)
Note
∑
wj = 1 and so the wj have an interpretation as portfolio weights; WAC
∗ is a weighted-sum
of the assumed interest-rate curve r.
A.3 Asymptotic yearly rollover
The yearly rollover fraction we seek is the limit of
RRt := q1,t/zt = θt,1
From the preceding this approaches the steady quantity RR∗ := θ∗1 = (Tγf)1/||Tγf ||1.
Rewrite expression (A.9) for the coupon-effective weights wj as wj = cjfj with
cj ∝ 1− γ−j
and
∑
wj = 1. Since all cj > 0 we can just as well write this as fj ∝ djwj for dj := 1/(1− γ−j),
as long as we again ensure that
∑
fj = 1. This gives
f = Dγw/||Dγw||1
where Dγ is a diagonal matrix with j
th entry dj. The equilibrium portfolio written this way
becomes
θ∗ = TγDγw/||TγDγw||1
and so we have
RR∗ = θ∗1 =
eT1 TγDγw
1TTγDγw
For the denominator, it is easy to show that 1TTγDγ = 1
T ; and since 1Tw = 1 for valid weights
w, it need not be written. Similarly, simple algebra shows
τT := eT1 TγDγ = (1, (γ − 1)/(γ2 − 1), (γ − 1)/(γ3 − 1), . . . , (γ − 1)/(γM − 1))
(Note that as γ → 1 this approaches the more intuitive limit, τ → (1, 1/2, . . . , 1/M).) We therefore
have,
RR∗ = τTw
where τj = (γ − 1)/(γj − 1). This is the expression (with γ − 1 = g) used in the text.
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A.4 Optimal tenor
Given issuance strategy f , deficit-growth assumption γ, and rate assumption r, we now have
expressions for the asymptotic portfolio cost
WAC∗ = rTw
and risk
RR∗ = τTw
where w = w(f) ∝ D−1γ f , 1Tw = 1, τj = (γ − 1)/(γj − 1), and Dγ is the diagonal matrix with
entries dj = 1/(1− γ−j).
Consider the special-case of an all-single-tenor issuance strategy at tenor j, f = ej. Then
w = ej and so this strategy has risk
RR∗(ej) = τj =
γ − 1
γj − 1
and cost
WAC∗(ej) = rj.
Note the function defining τj = (γ − 1)/(γj − 1) is decreasing and positively-convex in j, so that
for any other set of weights w,
RR∗(w) =
∑
τlwl ≥ τ(
∑
lwl) = τ(tWAC).
defining tWAC as in the text.
Suppose we have a set of weights w so that RR∗(w) ≤ RR∗(ej) = τj; that is, a strategy that
satisfies the same risk constraint as does single-tenor issuance at j. From the above inequality for
RR∗(w) it then must be the case that τ(tWAC) ≤ τj, and so, tWAC =
∑
l lwl ≥ j.
What can we say about its cost, WAC∗(w)? Assume we have a smooth representation of r(·)
everywhere, and define the function
φ(s) := τ(s) + r(s)
where  > 0. If  can be chosen so that φ′ = τ ′′ + r′′ > 0, i.e. φ is everywhere positively-convex,
then
φ(tWAC) ≤
∑
wlφ(l) =
∑
wlτl + 
∑
wlrl = RR
∗(w) + WAC∗(w) ≤ τj + WAC∗(w)
Thus
WAC∗(w) ≥ r(tWAC) + 1

(τ(tWAC)− τj)
Now if tWAC = j then the second expression vanishes, and this reduces to WAC
∗(w) ≥ rj. Assume
that tWAC > j, and (plausibly enough) that r is monotone increasing. Set
 :=
τj − τ(tWAC)
r(tWAC)− rj
to again discover WAC∗(w) ≥ rj. Hence no strategy can dominate the single-tenor issuance
w = ej for its level of risk, R = τj. Inverting the function defining τ(·) leads to the formula given
in the text.
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The preceding required φ′′ > 0 for this choice of , which places a (negative) lower-bound on
the convexity of r:
r′′(s) ≥ −
(
r(tWAC)− rj
τj − τ(tWAC)
)
τ ′′(s)
This shows how the argument can break down: if the long-term yield-curve assumption r has
regions of sufficient negative-convexity (e.g. has ”corners”, or overall is steep at the short end but
with a rapid switch to flat at the long end), the above argument fails and there need not be a
single optimal tenor. In such cases, barbelled (or similar) issuance could emerge as mathematically
optimal. We have found that for typical long-term, asymptotic rate assumptions of interest, this
case does not arise.
A.5 Constrained optimization
Suppose constraints on issuance take the form of lower and upper bounds L and U placed on f ;
that is,
0 ≤ Lj ≤ fj ≤ Uj ≤ 1
for all j. Notice we also (trivially) have Uj = 0 for tenors j that are not part of Treasury issuance.
This constrains the problem described in the previous section A.4 but its structure and solution
approach otherwise remains unchanged:
• Find weights w that minimize WAC∗(w) = wT r,
• Subject to constraints
f
∑
wj = 1
Tw = 1∑
τjwj = τ
Tw ≤ R
L ≤ f(w) = Dγw/||Dγw||1≤ U
The preceding is straightforward to cast as a linear programming problem. Optimal weights
w∗ are easily obtained numerically, from which they are then converted into the optimal new-issue
strategy f ∗ via
f ∗ =
Dγw
∗
||Dγw∗||1
Comparison of f ∗ with the current implied strategy f allows one to identify the cost-dominant
direction of improvement. Repeating this procedure for multiple choices of R one can trace the
(constrained) efficient frontier.
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